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Introduction
Over the years, there has been a significant debate over the ethics of
making active voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide available
for terminally ill patients, coming with increasing arguments on their moral
adequacy. There is an increasing tendency to write in favor of accepting
the morality of euthanasia in an effort to form public consensus. By
physician-assisted suicide it is meant that the physician provides the means
for a patient to end his or her life. By active euthanasia it is meant that the
physician personally administers a lethal drug. Death will be caused in
order to end a life of suffering, because the patient does not want to
continue living, or because life has deteriorated into a minimal condition
that cannot be considered dignified.
The considerable advancement of medicine in the last several years
has led to the question of whether it is obligatory to use all possible means
to keep a person alive, in other words, if we are to use all available therapy
even when there is little chance of success.
In this context there has appeared the question of a right to die with
dignity. For some, dying with dignity means dying without pain. Any
death that is accompanied by suffering is considered undignified. Death
can be induced by the administration of a drug with the intention of ending
the life as well as the suffering. Active life-ending interventions are
selected with the aim of quickly ending the patient's life when there is no
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possibility of a cure and the patient has manifested his desire not to
continue living. For many others the right to die with dignity implies the
removal of life support systems or the withdrawal of treatment from
terminally ill patients in order to allow them to succumb to the underlying
disease, thus freeing the patient from the slavery of overtreatment.
There has been a debate over the reach of the term "euthanasia." In
the past, the concept of euthanasia has been divided into active and passive.
By passive euthanasia it is meant to hasten the death of a patient by
removing life support equipment or by stopping medical procedures or
treatment. By active euthanasia it is meant to induce death by the
application of a lethal agent.
However, from the point of view of professional ethics it is irrelevant
whether the life of a patient is taken by act or by omission of a necessary
treatment. In both cases, death is induced intentionally. Rather, the
definition of euthanasia must be understdod as deliberately ending the life
of a patient who is suffering or has an incurable disease, when requested by
either the patient or the family.' Here, omission is taken to mean the
deprivation of a medical treatment that is considered valid and necessary
for the patient to live.
On the other hand, it is not euthanasia to refrain from medically futile
treatment, or to remove unnecessary life support systems, allowing the
patient to succumb to the underlying disease, or in death induced by
"double-effect" drugs that are given to relieve suffering, but may also
shorten life. There is no obligation to undergo or to prolong a treatment
that is considered futile by the medical profession . The practice of
hastening death with palliative care interventions to relieve the terminally
ill patient' s pain, suffering, and other symptoms is accepted as ethical and
legal, provided the intention of the physidan is to relieve pain and other
symptoms and not to hasten death .2
Physicians are considered the logical candidates to seek for help in
dying since, for many terminally ill patients, assistance in dying is seen as
an extension of relief from suffering and as a form of caring, consistent
with the profession. 3 Furthermore, it is already being done. According to
anonymous polls, 13 to 19 percent of physicians in the United States have
participated in physician-assisted suicide. 4 Oregon has become the first
state to legalize physician-assisted suicide.
In this paper, I am going to analyze and critique the arguments in
favor of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in order to make an
ethical judgment in the question of whether there exists a right to commit
suicide or to request euthanasia for terminally ill patients.
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Reasons Given in Favor of Euthanasia
and Physician-Assisted Suicide
1) The argument of poor quality of life. Those who advocate euthanasia
and physician-assisted suicide argue that in some circumstances living is
worse than dying, that the pain and suffering caused by a terminal disease
may make life so agonizing and unbearable that death may seem "an act of
humanity" and physician-assisted suicide a way to die with dignity.5 The
physician will act under the principle of beneficence to relieve the pain and
suffering of terminally ill patients. For the dying patient, suffering may go
far beyond pain. This includes: progressive loss of activity, mobility and
freedom, increasing helplessness and dependence on others, physical
discomforts such as nausea, dyspnea, inability to swallow or talk, fear of
dying, incontinence, weakness, loss of dignity, and dementia. 6 Life loses
all quality and meaning to the point that death is preferable.
2) Respect for autonomous persons demands recognition of their right
to decide how they will live their lives. This includes the dying process,
the ability to choose one's own destiny. We have the right to avoid
intolerable suffering and exert control over the way we die. Some authors
believe there is a right to commit suicide and, therefore, to be free of
unreasonable restrictions on the means by which one can exercise this
right.7 Battin has argued that there is an unequally distributed, but
fundamental, right to suicide which we have because it can be constitutive
of human dignity, at least in a negative sense, when life becomes
unbearable. 8 The patient's right to self-determination has been a most
central argument in favor of physician-assisted suicide. 9 Often it is
assumed, without argument, that this implies a patient's right to request
lo
another agent to intervene so as to bring about his or her death.
Even
with adequate palliative care there are cases in which it is not possible to
avoid the suffering. II
3) The principle of beneficence, compassion with the suffering. This
has been used as an argument in favor of euthanasia. 12 In this way, ·
euthanasia is considered a virtuous act. The nonabandonment of the patient
has been part of the traditional care provided by physicians. Physicianassisted suicide must be judged in light of this ethical principle of
nonabandonment.
4) The experiment with euthanasia in Holland. This is regarded as
successful by the general public and the medical profession in that country.
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5) The public stigma attached to suicide is decreasing. In most
jurisdictions, suicide is a legal act, and has been so for decades. Most
suicides are seen as resulting from temporary mental illness, usually
depression,14 but the reason that terminally ill patients desire to shorten the
process of dying is to terminate their suffering. This raises the concept of
rational suicide. A person who is terminally ill may not be able to exercise
the option of suicide because of mental or physical limitations. In a way,
they are being discriminated against because of their disability, given that
able-bodied people have the option.
6) The distinction between "passive" and "active" euthanasia has been
criticized for dependence on problematic conceptions of causation and
on the belief that the sheer difference between killing and letting die is
morally relevant. From the patient's point of view, discontinuing life
support measures and active voluntary euthanasia are similar in that the
fundamental desire is for an earlier and more comfortable death. The
intention is morally irrelevant in the evaluation of the morality of the
action. They are also similar morally in that both are done with the intent
15
of ending life.
In the case in which discontinuing supportive measures
and allowing the patient to die produces days or weeks of extreme
discomfort, active euthanasia seems to be morally preferable. 16 For some,
discontinuing a ventilator cannot be considered a refusal of treatment, but a
request to be killed. 17 For Patrick Hopkins18 there is no metaphysical,
essential, and intrinsic moral difference between machines and natural
bodily organs, so that omitting treatment is a form of killing since we
deprive the person of an organ that can only function with the aid of a
machine or medical technology and that we need to set aside our prejudices
against the artificial, and extend the option of good killing (active
euthanasia) to those trapped by nature. If our society recognizes that life
can be sufficiently burdensome on life-sustaining treatments, such as a
respirator or dialysis machine, and that this medical intervention can be
withdrawn or withheld (what some call passive euthanasia), then it can be
sufficiently burdensome to justify active euthanasia.
7) The principle of double effect is a form of active euthanasia.
Physicians are allowed to give increasing doses of narcotics when there is a
severe pain or, it is presumed, with the knowledge that these drugs depress
respiration and could hasten death. 19
8) John Hardwig has argued that when modern medicine allows us to
survive far longer than we can take care of ourselves, there is a duty or
responsibility to die in consideration of our loved ones, so as not to
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impose crushing burdens on them. 2o In a time when total medical
funding is restricted and being continually reduced, it may not be ethical to
engage in extremely expensive treatment of terminally ill people.
Responses to the Arguments
1) Quality of life issues are confused with the value that the quality of
life has. Quality of life issues have a strong subjective component. Very
easily the health care professional will substitute his/her quality of life
standard for that of the patient. Human life has an intrinsic value. Good
health cannot give dignity to human life because health does not possess
life in itself, rather it participates in life. The dignity of the person cannot
be erased by illness. Rather, loss of dignity is imputed to the patient by
reactions of caregivers and family to the patient' s plight or appearance.
2) The terminally ill patient is in an extremely vulnerable position, so
that his/her autonomy is diminished, suffering from depression,
anxiety, fear, dejection, rejection, and/or guilt. Under these conditions,
it is very difficult to have a clear conscience and some will almost blindly
follow the suggestions of a physician. To bring about death by euthanasia
is not within the competence of the medical profession. Physician-assisted
suicide is not consistent with the doctor's pledge to heal and treat.
Physician-assisted suicide is against the traditional ethical codes
(Hippocratic, World Health Association, AMA). It will lead to a distrust in
physicians. Furthermore, we do not have a right to commit suicide, for the
simple reason that life does not belong completely to us. No one can say
that he/she has given life to himself/herself. Recently in two unanimous
decisions, the Supreme Court of the United States declined to
constitutionalize the "right to death with dignity" (26 June 1997,
Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quilf). In these, the plaintiffs
contended that the statutes violated their patients' Fourteenth Amendment
"liberty interest," so that there is a constitutionally recognized "right to die"
that outweighs the state's interest in preventing suicide by "terminally ill
competent adults who wish to hasten their deaths with medication
prescribed by their physicians." Not all intimate choices about one's life
qualifY as protected rights.
3) The compassion that is talked about by the proponents of
euthanasia reflects a distorted view. True compassion does not eliminate
the sufferer, but seeks to relieve the cause of the suffering. Otherwise, the
life of the patient is devalued. Besides, compassion is a spiritual quality,
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which means "suffering with," to be presented to the sufferer. It is not a
principle or a self-justifying reason.

4) The experience of the Netherlands has shown the reality of the
slippery slope. There have been successive steps in relaxation of criteria:
extension to non-terminal patients, minors, Down syndrome, patients with
mental suffering, severe depression, dementia, involuntary euthanasia
"under certain conditions," and non-terminal AIDS patients.21
5) It is not the same to commit suicide as it is to aid in a suicide. The
latter is a form of homicide, even if the underlying reason is compassion.
Though attempting suicide has lately been decriminalized, the state' s
interest in preventing it has not wavered, including penalizing those who
aid in the attempt. No matter how ill a person is, he is still among the
living and therefore has a right to live. Data suggest that the interest of
patients in euthanasia stems, in the majority of cases, to depression or
psychological distress, rather than pain. This suggests that much of the
debate about euthanasia is misplaced, since it focuses on pain and the use
of euthanasia for pain relief, when in fact pain does not seem to be the
primary motive. 22 Suffering of psychological origin can also be relieved
with adequate counseling and psychiatric intervention. With proper
support, including pain relief, psychological and spiritual therapy, and
friendship, the patient can die in a dignified way as a member of the human
family. No present-day legislation allows for help in committing suicide
for a person who is going through a period of depression. Rather, their
depression would be treated. To legalize physician-assisted suicide would
contribute to desensitization to killing throughout all of society.
6) There is a special relationship between the doctor and patient. An
omission of an act, if it brings about harm, may bring legal liability. If a
competent patient refuses consent to treatment or continued treatment, the
legal effect is that the physician is absolved from his or her duty by the
patient. The physician terminates the treatment, but the subsequent death is
caused by the underlying disease which the physician no longer has
authority to treat. The physician is not killing the patient but letting him
die. Ordinarily no one is under a duty to help a neighbor, such omissions to
act bring no liability.23
We cannot forbid the voluntary acceptance of a death which medical
intervention can only postpone. What is forbidden is unlawful killing.
Often in the dialogue there is a confusion between passive euthanasia and
euthanasia by omission. The latter brings legal liability but the former does
not since natural deaths are not killing and thus are neither illegal nor
256
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immoral and do not confer responsibility. In this sense, it will be helpful if
the term "passive euthanasia" is avoided while we retain the qualification
of euthanasia by omission, which implies a negligent act. An example that
intention has its place in moral life is that when the person does not die
after removal of the treatment, the person is left alive. This is not satisfied
by assisted suicide. It is one thing to desire death and bring this about
actively, and another to desire death and allow it to occur. It is one thing to
respect the will of the patient to reject treatment and another to take his life.
It is not merely a psychological difference, but also a moral one. To allow
someone to die of a disease for which we are not responsible and cannot
cure is to allow the disease to be the cause of death. The intention of
allowing one to die is compassion and not death, while the intention of
active euthanasia is death as a means for compassion.24
Conclusions about causation simply reflect judgments about the right
place to assign responsibility. When a person turns off a life-supporting
respirator without authority it is clear that he is causing the patient' s death.
But when a physician follows the patient' s directions to disconnect a
respirator he has not acted wrongfully, since he has no duty to continue
treatment against the patient's wishes, even though this is causally related
to the patient' s death.
It is not dignified to continue aggressive treatment of the patient when
there are no possibilities of cure (futile treatment).25 A futile treatment
does not produce a benefit any longer to the patient, but damage.26 It is not
the same thing to help to live someone who is living as it is to prevent to
die someone who is dying. A treatment is considered futile if it only
preserves unconsciousness or does not allow an end to dependency on the
intensive care unit. Quantitatively, a physician can consider a treatment
futile when the empirical data demonstrate that it has less than 1%
probability of being beneficial to the patient. 27 Life and death issues cannot
be decided with absolute certainty, simply because there is no strict and
specific relation between the etiology and the disease. Our knowledge of
an empirical reality is always approximate, probable. We cannot ask a
physician for an absolute degree of certainty in his or her decisions.
Nevertheless, it is the decision of the patient to continue with a futile
treatment, since there is no absolute certainty. For an act of omission to be
euthanasic the treatment omitted or withdrawn must be a useful one, not a
futile one.

7) Optimal palliative care could provide adequate pain relief for most
terminally ill patients. 28 Inpatient hospice units provide an example of
supportive measures at the end of life with comfort care rendering
superfluous any consideration of physician-assisted suicide. To legalize
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physician-assisted suicide would divert attention away from pain relief and
palliative care. The easy road for the health care professional is to be free
from frustration , hostility and anguish that come from "hopeless" cases.
The issue of hastening death with palliative care interventions for
terminally ill patients is accepted as ethical and legal, provided the
intention of the physician is to relieve pain and other symptoms and not to
hasten death. 29 A disproportionate sedation can cause interruption of
feeding and hydration of the patient, who will die of hunger or thirst in a
state of unconsciousness, or will die of overdose. In this case, euthanasia
can be hidden and is effected by an omission that leads to the patient's
death by hunger. Ethically, the physician must look for pain relief that will
carry less risk and still free the patient from unnecessary suffering.

8) To allow physician-assisted suicide would leave an impact on other
sufferers who are ill, aged, or weak. This would devalue their lives and
they may undergo assisted suicide under pressure. Further pressure is
exercised if there are economical constraints. This undermines the call to
generosity to those who surround the patient, who must free the patient
from extra pressures.
Ethical Reflections
Practically all religious traditions, including groups such as
Christians, Muslims, and Jews, consider life as a gift from God, to be given
and taken at the time of His choosing. Suicide can never be an option .
Aristotle affirmed JO that suicide is an unjust act and cannot be allowed, not
because it goes against the individual, but because it goes against the
community. Human life has value and dignity in and of itself because it is
the life of a person. Physical life is constitutive of the person and a
condition for his existence, is the fundamental value of the person, and
therefore cannot be valued, taking as criteria minor and relative values, nor
can it be relegated to the disposition of others. 3 1 Besides, Christians
believe that God supports people in suffering and, therefore, to actively
seek an end to one ' s life would represent a lack of trust in God' s promise.
Also, as Christians we have an obligation to support and be with those who
are suffering and we believe that suffering brings us closer to Christ,
identifying us with His cross and participating in redemption. Part of the
problem with the present debate over euthanasia is that no value is given to
suffering. Even considering that life can become unbearable, the final
word is that life cannot be taken . Suicide is not ethical.
The question that has been raised is whether believers have the right
to take their own personal beliefs and extend them to the entire population,
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including secularists, atheists, and agnostics. I will argue that they do in
this case, since believers are not saying anything that a non-believer could
not accept as rational. Both believers and non-believers agree with the
common conception that life and death are given to us. Not everything is
autonomous in the human being. We do not give life to ourselves, we have
received it from our parents. Therefore we do not have absolute dominion
over our own lives and we cannot take them. We must distinguish between
possessing something, such as our lives, and assuming it. We have
received our lives, life is not an object that we possess, rather, we are
responsible for what we do with our lives and we are able to choose
options. These possibilities make us able to assume our lives. We are
personal living beings, but we do not possess our lives as we would an
object.
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